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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT or Treaty) is the most widely 
subscribed to and successful arms control treaty in existence, with 190 states 
party to the Treaty.1  It is the foundation and cornerstone of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and has withstood the tests of time and changed 
circumstance.  The NPT is fundamentally sound but suffers from an 
unfortunate lack of clarity in certain areas.  The subject of this Article 
concerns the possibility that a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) party to 
the NPT might argue that the Treaty’s Article II permits NNWSs to assist 
other states or non-state actors in developing nuclear weapons without 
violating the Treaty.2  This remarkable state of affairs exists because Article 
II fails to directly address the possibility of NNWSs providing assistance in 
obtaining a nuclear weapon to other NNWSs due to the singular role 
assigned by the NPT to nuclear weapons states (NWSs) and NNWSs as 
suppliers and consumers, respectively and exclusively.3  For a variety of 
reasons, this will likely remain a theoretical issue, since it is admittedly hard 
to imagine an NNWS party to the NPT arguing that it was permitted to assist 
a non-party to develop weapons.  Rather, the NNWS would likely argue that 
it did not, in fact, provide such assistance or that such assistance did not, in 
fact, benefit a nuclear weapons program.  
Before delving into that specific issue, it is important to understand that it 
will be considered within the contextual ambiguity of the NPT itself.  Other 
problems exist in the NPT due to the lack of specificity and precision in its 
terms, which is often the end result of multilateral negotiations.  A challenge 
frequently discussed and of great concern today is that the NPT allows an 
NPT state party, while in technical compliance with the Treaty’s provisions, 
to acquire nuclear material, equipment, and technology from other NPT 
parties to master the nuclear fuel cycle, and then, later, legally withdraw 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty]; see also G.A. Res. 
1380 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1380(XIV) (Nov. 20, 1959); G.A. Res. 2373 (XXII), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2373(XXII) (June 12, 1968).  For an article presenting possible scenarios for 
bringing the four states not party to the NPT that are believed to possess nuclear weapons, 
which are India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea (having acceded, but subsequently 
withdrawing), see David S. Jonas, Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the “Final Four” Join the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States While Retaining Their 
Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 417. 
 2 This legal option is now foreclosed, albeit not by the NPT itself, but by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1540.  S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).   
 3 See MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION, 1959–1979, at 262 (1980). 
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from the Treaty.4  North Korea, often accused of this violation, is not a good 
example of this; it acquired very little legally under the NPT, and none of 
those acquisitions contributed to its nuclear weapons program.5  It relied, 
rather, on indigenous development and black market acquisitions.6  Several 
years ago, the former Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, called for this significant issue to be 
addressed, by noting his belief that it was time to limit the production of 
weapons-usable materials in civilian nuclear programs, as well as the 
manufacture of new material via enrichment and reprocessing, by restricting 
these functions to facilities under international control.7   
To date, states like Iran8 and North Korea9 have not built their nuclear 
weapons programs through open trade consistent with the NPT, but rather 
                                                                                                                   
 4 See Leonard S. Spector, Slowing Proliferation: Why Legal Tools Matter, 34 VT. L. REV. 
619, 624 (2010) (“[T]here are legitimate reasons for countries to have enrichment or 
reprocessing capabilities, since both can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors.  
Unfortunately, if a state develops these plants, it can build a stockpile of material that is very 
close to what is needed for a bomb.  If it were to suddenly pull out of the NPT and tell the 
[International Atomic Energy Agency] to go home and if it had prepared non-nuclear 
components for nuclear weapons in advance, it could produce nuclear arms in a matter of 
weeks, under some scenarios.”).  For more on issues surrounding the nuclear fuel cycle, see 
Christopher E. Paine, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Global Security, and Climate Change: 
Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Power Expansion, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1047, 
1048 n.4 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the dual military-civil potential of nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities creates an inherent tension between the exercise of this inalienable right and the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons.”); see also Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo, Will Climate Change 
Alter the NPT Political Balance? New Challenges for the Non-Proliferation Regime, 21 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 205, 206–11, 215 (2010) (focusing on the possibility of implementing a multilateral 
system for uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel recycling). 
 5 See JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
38 (2007) (noting that the “global nuclear black market” established by Pakistani nuclear 
scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan “provided equipment to Iran, Libya, North Korea and perhaps 
other nations beginning in the 1980s”); see also Thomas L. Neff, Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Mass. 
Inst. of Tech., The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and The Bush Nonproliferation Initiative, Address at 
the World Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2004, at 7 (Apr. 1, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.ia 
ea.org/newscenter/focus/fuelcycle/neff.pdf) (“[T]he fact is that the civilian fuel cycle has not 
been a significant contributor to proliferation. Those nations that wanted nuclear weapons 
have gone straight for them.  Israel, India and North Korea used research reactors.”). 
 6 See supra note 5. 
 7 Mohamed ElBaradei, Towards a Safer World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 47. 
 8 Neff, supra note 5, at 7 (“Iran spent nearly twenty years on a clandestine enrichment 
program but only when this program was discovered did it claim it was for civilian purposes.”); 
see generally S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010) (summarizing the multiple 
violations of the current international nonproliferation regime by the Iranian government).  
 9 Spector, supra note 4, at 627 (“Sadly, Iran is not the only country engaged in suspicious 
[weapon of mass destruction] activities that has defied the U.N. Security Council in recent 
years.  Most prominently, after North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, the Council 
adopted a binding resolution, again under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, that required North 
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through clandestine development in violation of the NPT and denial of IAEA 
access to evaluate their programs fully.  Nevertheless, the Obama 
Administration is working hard to address both the spread of sensitive 
nuclear technologies and the potential for abuse of the withdrawal provision 
of the NPT.10  During the U.S. ratification process, however, the 
administration advised the Senate that the right to withdrawal would be self-
judging.11  
The President has made nuclear security a centerpiece of his policy 
agenda as evidenced by his Prague speech12 which set forth the 
administration’s nonproliferation and disarmament agenda.  Additionally, the 
Administration sponsored the first Nuclear Security Summit13 (conducted at 
the head of state level), pushed for a successful NPT 2010 Review 
Conference,14 and most recently, was active at the UN First Committee15 and 
the General Conference of the IAEA.16   
                                                                                                                   
Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapon program and rejoin the NPT, from which it had 
withdrawn in 2003.  The Resolution also imposed an international embargo on conventional 
arms transfers and nuclear- and missile-related transfers to Pyongyang.  But North Korea, as 
we know, disregarded these demands, continuing its nuclear weapon program and last May 
conducting a second nuclear test.  The Council shortly afterward adopted a further resolution, 
imposing additional sanctions on North Korea and again demanding that North Korea end its 
nuclear weapon program, so far to no avail.”). 
 10 Barack Obama, U.S. Pres., Remarks in Hradcany Square in Prague (Apr. 5, 2009) 
[hereinafter Obama Prague Speech] (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pr 
ess_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/) (“We need real 
and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the 
[NPT] without cause.”). 
 11 See Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 
Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 
VA. J. INT’L L. 749, 792–95 (1994) (“At a minimum, then, at least with respect to its 
representations to the Congress, the Executive Branch did not argue that there were legal 
limits on a state’s right to withdraw from the NPT.”); see also id. at 794 n.134 (quoting 
Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 367–68 (1969)). 
 12 See Obama Prague Speech, supra note 10. 
 13 Nuclear Security Summit, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/nuclearsummit (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2011).  
 14 See 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010 (last visited Dec. 7, 
2011) (providing information related to the conference); see also Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of 
State, U.S., Statement to the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (May 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/201 
0/statements/pdf/usa_en.pdf) (emphasizing the Obama Administration’s commitment to 
reducing the threat of nuclear weapons).  
 15 Rose Gottemoeller, Assoc. Sec’y, U.S. Bureau of Arms Control, Remarks to the First 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 4, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/10/05/first-committee/).  
 16 Steven Chu, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, Statement to the 2011 IAEA General Conference 
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Another area of the NPT that a non-party state might seek to exploit is the 
fact that the term NNWS is not defined in the treaty.17  Even though it is 
presumed from the text of the NPT that NNWSs are states that do not 
possess nuclear weapons, this lack of a precise definition could potentially 
allow non-party states to argue that they should be able to accede to the NPT 
as an NNWS while retaining their nuclear weapons, since Article II does not 
expressly prohibit “possession” of nuclear weapons.18  The United States 
would reject such an argument, viewing it as incompatible with the 
provisions of the NPT as well as its object and purpose19 to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons.  In all likelihood, other NPT parties would take 
the same view.  For that reason, a non-party would not be likely to advance 
such an argument.  However, absent a precise definition of the term NNWS 
in the Treaty, the possibility of such a “creative” legal argument cannot be 
ruled out entirely.20    
This Article takes an in-depth look at a lack of clarity within Article II of 
the NPT which has historically been overlooked by the major world powers, 
but which could become a very real problem, particularly given the current 
international increase in nuclear trade and export, which could continue, 
particularly if the predicted “nuclear renaissance”21 comes to pass.  Indeed, 
many states such as the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, India, and Saudi 
Arabia are clearly embracing nuclear power.22  However, the current nuclear 
crisis in Japan is making such a renaissance look much less likely.23   
                                                                                                                   
(Sept. 19, 2011) (remarks as prepared for delivery available at http://energy.gov/downloads/se 
cretary-steven-chu-remarks-prepared-delivery-2011-iaea-general-conference). 
 17 Jonas, supra note 1, at 442. 
 18 See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. II (placing express prohibitions on the 
transfer, manufacture, acquisition, and receipt of aid in the manufacture or acquisition of a 
nuclear weapon or explosive device, but not mentioning possession); see also Jonas, supra 
note 1, at 442 (“[N]othing in the NPT explicitly prohibits a non-NPT NNWS from possessing 
nuclear weapons upon accession to the NPT.”). 
 19 Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, arts. I–II.  Additionally, State Department 
lawyers confirmed this view in conversations in March 2011.  
 20 See Jonas, supra note 1, at 441−50 for an example of this type of argument.  
 21 Given the concern with global warming and nuclear power as the only fuel that does not 
generate carbon, many have predicted an abundance of new nuclear plants in the coming 
decades. 
 22 See Ayesha Daya, Nuclear Energy Program Supported by 85% of U.A.E. Residents, 
BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-16/nuclear-energy-p 
rogram-supporteed-by-85-of-u-a-e-residents.html (discussing U.A.E. citizens’ support for 
development of nuclear power plants). 
 23 See Matthew L. Wald, ‘Zombie Reactor’ in U.S. Being Brought Back to Life, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., June 17, 2011, at 18 (“Since an earthquake and tsunami unleashed a nuclear 
disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in Japan in March, several countries have distanced 
themselves from nuclear energy.  The German chancellor announced her intention to close all 
of the country’s nuclear facilities by 2022, and the Swiss Parliament is heading in the same 
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It may be argued that Article II permits NNWSs to assist other states, or 
non-state actors, in developing nuclear weapons without violating the terms 
of the Treaty.  Although Article II has other imperfections—such as the lack 
of a definition of “manufacture” and a clear meaning of weaponization 
activities24 —this lack of clarity, which may be argued to permit NNWSs to 
supply others with nuclear weapons technology, should be troubling to those 
concerned with proliferation.  Any horizontal proliferation, i.e., increase in 
the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, is particularly insidious 
given the historical patterns of weapons acquisition.25  
This concern regarding transfer goes beyond the strictly academic.  Most 
states with civil nuclear power programs possess advanced knowledge of the 
nuclear fuel cycle and have, as a consequence, acquired an understanding of 
critical portions of the weaponization process.26  Several NNWSs either 
possessed or considered active nuclear weapon programs at some point in 
recent history.  States such as Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, and Argentina 
were among those that considered nuclear weapons programs.27  Several 
others, such as South Africa, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, had 
possession of operational nuclear weapons, but voluntarily acceded to the 
                                                                                                                   
direction.  A modern reactor project in Texas was canceled after Fukushima, and one in 
Maryland fell apart last year.  And even before the catastrophe in Japan, the nuclear industry 
as a whole had been suffering from a surfeit of generating capacity, the low price of natural 
gas and the high price of construction.”); see also Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current “Nuclear 
Renaissance” in the United States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls, 29 
ENERGY L.J. 279, 372 (2008) (“Another kind of catastrophe that could scuttle the nuclear 
renaissance would be a serious radioactive release from a plant due to damage from an 
earthquake, hurricane, or tornado.”). 
 24 See Mary Beth Sheridan & Colum Lynch, Obama Hopeful of Broad Support for Further 
U.N. Sanctions on Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2010, at A5 (discussing the debate over possible 
sanctions against Iran based on accusations of pursuit of nuclear weapons). 
 25 See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 102–09 (discussing the nuclear ambitions of several 
states); see also Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World 
Order, 138 MIL. L. REV. 187, 222 (1992) (“In addition to terrorism, arms proliferation causes 
tensions for many reasons. A state naturally creates tensions by building military strength for 
its own security because, by doing so, it concomitantly raises its neighbors’ fears.  Regional 
powers also can create tensions in their attempts to balance the need for regional security with 
the community’s interest in preventing arms proliferation.  Similarly, states that produce arms 
create tensions by pitting manufacturers’ and suppliers’ desires for profits against the 
community’s desire to prevent proliferation.”). 
 26 See Michael V. Hynes et al., Denying Armageddon: Preventing Terrorist Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 607 AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., ANNALS, 150, 154 (2006) (“Reactors and 
associated technologies also create a cadre of individuals skilled in the nuclear area, some of 
whom might aid a nuclear weapons program for radical reasons or personal gain.”). 
 27 See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 25, 32 (noting that Argentina and Brazil “benefited from 
the [Atoms for Peace] program and used it as a springboard to build, or attempt to build, 
nuclear weapons,” while Sweden and Switzerland engaged in “prolonged internal debate” 
before deciding not to pursue nuclear weapons). 
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NPT which required relinquishing those weapons.28  All of those states, and 
many others, now have the requisite knowledge and ability to assist another 
state in its pursuit of nuclear weapons if they chose to do so. 
Parties outside the NPT regime tend to be somewhat isolated from 
international diplomacy, at least in the disarmament arena, and thus pose 
greater proliferation risks when they attain nuclear weapons capabilities in 
that they are not bound by any of the nonproliferation commitments 
undertaken by NPT states parties.29  They are often more likely to participate 
in swaps of nuclear weapons technology in order to meet other requirements 
in non-nuclear areas and for diplomatic reasons.30  Further, proliferation 
rarely occurs in isolation.31  When one state acquires a nuclear weapon, other 
states in the region often react to level the playing field.32   
In short, use of the Article II ambiguity could create an amplification 
problem: NNWS recipients could become suppliers themselves and parties 
could withdraw from the NPT to counter power imbalances.   
In order to provide a better understanding of the effects of the lack of 
clarity and the importance of finding ways to address it, this Article will 
analyze the evolution of the NPT, particularly Article II, during the drafting 
conference, and discuss how Article II ultimately contained this deficiency.  
This Article will then present theories as to why the ambiguity was not 
resolved during the drafting conferences despite being brought to the 
attention of the drafters.  To demonstrate the potentially serious ramifications 
                                                                                                                   
 28 See Winston P. Nagan, Nuclear Arsenals, International Lawyers, and the Challenge of 
the Millennium, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 485, 509 (1999) (“Although it has the raw materials and 
technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons, South Africa has set the example for Africa: It 
neither wants nuclear weapons, nor does it want to make or deploy them.”); see also Wendy 
L. Mirsky, Comment, The Link Between Russian Organized Crime and Nuclear-Weapons 
Proliferation: Fighting Crime and Ensuring International Security, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 
749, 777 (1995) (“[U]nder the NPT, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have agreed to 
transfer many of their nuclear warheads to Russia.”).  
 29 See, e.g., DAVID ALBRIGHT, INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SECURITY, SOUTH AFRICA’S SECRET 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 8 (1994), available at http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/south-africa 
s-secret-nuclear-weapons/ (detailing alleged South African nuclear technology exchanges with 
Israel). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See generally ELIZABETH BAKANIC ET AL., PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CHAIN 
REACTIONS: JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND EGYPT (2008), available at http://wws.princeton.edu/ 
research/pwreports_f07/wws591f.pdf (discussing factors that would induce each country to 
pursue development of nuclear weapons). 
 32 See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 103 (“[W]hat a state like Iran might see as a defensive 
move would provoke dangerous reactions from other states in the region.  A nuclear reaction 
chain could ripple through a region and across the globe, triggering weapon decisions in 
several, perhaps many, other states.”).  One might also look to recent history in Iraq, Syria, 
and Iran. 
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of this problem, a case study will be presented illustrating its relevance.  
Finally, the Article will offer proposals for addressing it. 
II.  HISTORY OF ARTICLE II 
On December 20, 1961, the United Nations (UN) sponsored the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC)33 in Geneva, Switzerland, in 
which the United States and the Soviet Union were to lead the negotiations 
for a comprehensive arms control and disarmament treaty that was to become 
known as the NPT.34  Pursuant to this Treaty, NWSs agreed to: refrain from 
spreading nuclear weapons and related technology to NNWSs;35 recognize 
the right of NNWSs to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and assist in that 
pursuit;36 and pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith.37  
These commitments were made in exchange for an agreement from NNWSs 
to refrain from developing nuclear weapons.38  At its core, this “ ‘Grand 
Bargain’ of the NPT guarantees all [NNWSs] party to the NPT the benefits 
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and in turn requires the NWSs to 
negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.39    
However, the negotiations establishing the NPT were anything but swift 
and congenial.40  The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) announced 
on November 19, 1965, the underlying principles that should govern the 
establishment of a disarmament and nonproliferation treaty in an attempt to 
expedite the drafting process.41  The UNGA listed first among these guiding 
principles the critical need that “[t]he treaty should be void of any loop-holes 
which might permit . . . non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or 
indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.”42  And yet, Article II of the NPT, 
the core obligation for NNWSs, contains precisely such a deficiency by 
                                                                                                                   
 33 Also referred to as the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD). 
 34 G.A. Res. 1722 (XVI), pt. II, U.N. Doc. A/4980 (Dec. 20, 1961).  
 35 Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 36 Id. art. IV. 
 37 Id. art. VI. 
 38 Id. art. II. 
 39 David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal Status in 
the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1007, 1012 (2007). 
 40 See U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
AGREEMENTS 83–86 (6th ed. 1984) (discussing the NPT negotiation process). 
 41 G.A. Res. 2028 (XX), para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Nov. 19, 1965), reprinted in U.S. 
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1965, at 532 
(1966); see also DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 6–7 (2009) (discussing the UN’s proposed principles). 
 42 G.A. Res. 2028 (XX), supra note 41, para. 2.  
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failing to address the possibility of NNWS transfers of nuclear weapons 
technology.43  Of course, there might be a violation of NPT Article III by 
such activity.44 
III.  THE AMBIGUITY ISSUE 
In many ways, the Article II ambiguity, which could operate to the 
detriment of the NPT, reflects an overly simplistic framing of the 
nonproliferation bargain.  At the time the NPT was drafted, NWSs were 
viewed as holding the key to nuclear weapons.45  Thus, the NPT may be read 
as imposing negative supply-side obligations on the NWSs under Articles I 
and IV.  Article I directly obliges NWSs to not “transfer . . . nuclear weapons 
or other explosive devices,” nor “assist, encourage, or induce” NNWSs to 
acquire nuclear weapons.46  Although the NPT does not explicitly name the 
NWSs, it is a clearly defined term by comparison to the undefined term 
“NNWS.”  NWS is defined by temporal circumstance in Article IX as a state 
that “has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.”47  Coincidentally, that group is the 
same as the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council: U.S, UK, 
France, Russia, and China.48  
It is understood that, as keepers of advanced nuclear technology, NWSs 
have a special opportunity to contribute to the development of nuclear energy 
in NNWSs under Article IV.49  Compared to NWSs, under the NPT, NNWSs 
are viewed as consumers who lack, but desire nuclear technology.  Thus, 
NNWSs may be similarly viewed as subject to demand-side obligations in 
                                                                                                                   
 43 See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. II (prohibiting NNWSs from seeking or 
receiving nuclear weapons while failing to expressly prohibit possession).  
 44 See id. art. III, para. 1 (“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to 
accept safeguards . . . with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful 
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”). 
 45 Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation 
Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 131 (1994). 
 46 Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.  
 47 Id. art. IX, para. 3. 
 48 Christopher C. Joyner & Alexander Ian Parkhouse, Nuclear Terrorism in a Globalizing 
World: Assessing the Threat and the Emerging Management Regime, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 203, 
214 (2009) (“Nuclear weapons are held by the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, as well as by India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea.”). 
 49 See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 2 (“All the Parties to the Treaty 
undertake to facilitate . . . the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  Parties to the Treaty in 
a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing . . . to the further development of the 
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of [NNWSs] 
Party to the Treaty . . . .”). 
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Articles II and III.  Additionally, the NPT subtly differentiates between 
NNWSs and NNWSs party to the Treaty by using both terms in reference to 
NNWSs in different Articles of the Treaty.  For example, Article I prohibits 
NWSs from sharing nuclear weapons with “any [NNWS]” as opposed to 
merely NNWSs party to the NPT.50  Article II, conversely, specifically refers 
to NNWS party to the Treaty.51     
Article II, in short, forbids NNWSs party to the NPT from 
receiving, manufacturing, and acquiring nuclear weapons.  Indeed, the term 
“not to seek” assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons means not to 
make an effort anywhere, including seeking assistance from non-NPT 
signatories, non-state actors, or even NWSs.  With this, the NPT restrictions 
can be read quite broadly.  Article II states:  
  
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or 
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices.52 
 
Article III ensures that the obligations in Article II are fulfilled, by requiring 
NNWSs to accept IAEA safeguards (methods used by the IAEA to ensure 
that no diversion of nuclear material takes place from peaceful nuclear 
programs to weapons programs such as cameras, tags, seals, and inspections) 
in order to prevent the “diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”53  By dividing state 
parties to the NPT into haves and have-nots, and then attributing a singular 
role to each, the NPT, remarkably, does not directly address the possibility 
that NNWSs could be supply-side actors that furnish nuclear weapons 
technology or material to other states. 
Article II presents proliferation solely as a problem of NNWSs attempting 
to gain nuclear weapons.  Noticeably absent from these obligations is any 
prohibition on transferring nuclear weapons technology or assisting in the 
development of such technology.  The failure to address the potential of 
NNWSs to perform a supply-side role leaves a significant legal and policy 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Id. art. I. 
 51 Id. art. II. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. art. III, para. 1. 
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gap in the NPT.  By this glaring and inexplicable omission in Article II, an 
NNWS might argue that it is permitted to lawfully assist another state or a 
non-state actor in acquiring nuclear weapons without violating the terms of 
the Treaty.  Again, such activity might violate Article III. 
Were such assistance to be provided to another NNWS party to the NPT, 
the state receiving such assistance would be in violation of its Article II 
obligations.  However, a number of scenarios exist where neither party 
would necessarily be in violation of the NPT.  If an NNWS were to provide 
indigenously developed nuclear weapons expertise to a non-state actor or to a 
state not a party to the Treaty, the NPT party might argue that neither the 
provider nor the recipient of the assistance would be in violation of the NPT.  
Since the NPT focus is on states, it does not apply to non-state actors, but 
non-state actors are relevant in many plausible threat scenarios today.54  In 
summary, the core infirmity of the Article II ambiguity is that the NNWS 
party to the NPT that is providing the assistance to the nuclear weapons 
program of another state, entity, or group would be able to argue that it is not 
in violation of Article II.  
Despite being the most widely accepted arms control treaty in history, a 
small number of states are not party to the NPT.55  NNWSs could 
theoretically assist such states in developing nuclear weapons with impunity, 
although NNWSs party to the NPT could not legally receive such assistance.  
                                                                                                                   
 54 Joseph Cirincione, former director of nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, has called “[t]he danger of nuclear terrorism . . . the most serious threat” 
of the early twenty-first century.  CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 87; see also id. at 89–95 
(asserting that “the most serious threat” comes from non-state actors bent on committing acts 
of terrorism by exploiting a variety of nuclear sources, from civilian stockpiles to neglected 
Cold War weapons stores). 
 55 NPT (In Alphabetical Order), UNITED NATIONS, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.  
nsf/NPT%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView (last visited Dec. 8, 2011) (states not 
party to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea).  As a separate issue, Taiwan 
deserves mention here although it does not possess nuclear weapons.  While it is not a state in 
the UN context, it certainly should qualify as a state otherwise.  As a matter of international 
law, it fits the criteria, but due to the political strength of the People’s Republic of China, 
attempts by Taiwan to obtain official statehood have failed.  Mark S. Zaid, Taiwan: It Looks 
Like It, It Acts Like It, but Is It a State? The Ability to Achieve a Dream Through Membership 
in International Organizations, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 806 (1998).  But regardless of 
geopolitics, Taiwan is as likely an entity as any to be tempted to pursue a nuclear weapons 
program, particularly if the U.S. were for some reason to weaken its policy commitments to 
Taiwan or if hostilities in Asia were to flare up again.  Recent Legislation, Foreign Relations 
Law – Nuclear Nonproliferation – Congress Authorizes the President To Waive Restrictions 
on Nuclear Exports to India. – Henry J. Hyde United States–India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
Cooperation Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-401, tit. I, 120 Stat. 2726 (to be codified at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 2652c, 8001–8008, and 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d)), 120 HARV. L. REV. 2020, 2026 
(2007). 
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The problem is compounded by the fact that states may withdraw from the 
NPT with relative ease.56   
This ability to withdraw opens the unsettling possibility that the number 
of states not subject to the NPT’s obligations could rise, increasing the 
number of states that NNWSs could assist without either state contravening 
the NPT.  Further, nothing in the NPT generally, or in Article II specifically, 
regulates non-state actors, in that they are not bound by the Treaty.  Although 
such non-state actors may be subject to other laws, if assistance were given 
to these groups or individuals, the assisting NNWS might argue that neither 
it nor the receiving non-state actor violated the NPT.  These possibilities for 
proliferation reveal a significant flaw in the drafting of Article II. 
While non-state actors may seem irrelevant in the NPT context, since 
such actors have no status under the Treaty, although the state where the 
non-state actor resided could be technically responsible, non-state actors did 
not represent credible and persistent threats when the NPT was drafted, but 
they do now.  Article I refers to “any recipient” whatsoever while Article II 
prohibits seeking or receiving any assistance of any kind.57  In that sense, 
non-state actors, while not given a duty under the Treaty, are duly noted and 
may not serve as a lawful source of proliferation materials. 
Significantly, none of the original drafts of the NPT contained this Article 
II issue.  In the first draft of Article II, issued in August of 1965 to the 
ENDC, the United States included provisions that flatly forbade NNWSs 
from “tak[ing] any . . . action which would cause an increase in the total 
number of States and other Organizations having independent power to use 
nuclear weapons.”58  Further, NNWSs were required not to 
“grant . . . assistance [in the manufacture of nuclear weapons].”59  Following 
the submission of this 1965 draft to the ENDC, the U.S. Delegation briefly 
                                                                                                                   
 56 For example, although attended by much controversy, no serious challenges were made 
to the North Korean withdrawal in 2003.  See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. X, 
para. 1 (“Each Party shall . . . have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country.  It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty 
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance.  Such notice shall 
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme 
interests.”); see also George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, NPT Withdrawal: Time for the 
Security Council to Step In, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2005, at 17 (arguing the Security 
Council should increase its role in NPT withdrawal). 
 57 Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, arts. I–II. 
 58 United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft 
Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, art. II, para. 1, U.N. DCOR, Supp. Jan.–
Dec. 1965, U.N. Doc. DC/227 (Aug. 17, 1965), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & 
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 347.   
 59 Id. para. 2. 
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explained the reasoning behind each article.  In regard to its draft of Article 
II and the obligations it placed on NNWS, the U.S. Delegation highlighted 
the importance of the obligation placed on NNWSs not to increase the 
number of nuclear entities in the world:  
This simple draft would thus prevent any increase in the 
number of nuclear Powers.  You will all remember President 
Kennedy’s fear that there would be no rest for anyone, no 
stability, no real security and no chance for disarmament in a 
world with a growing number of nuclear Powers.  This draft 
would ensure that there would be no increase in the number, 
even by one.60 
This statement seems to suggest that, at that time, the United States 
recognized the importance of drafting Article II in such a manner which 
would not only prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by an NNWS, but 
also in a way that would prevent NNWSs from taking any actions which 
might lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Further, the United 
States was not the only state to recognize the need to draft the Treaty in a 
manner that would directly tackle the possibility of NNWS proliferation.  
The United Kingdom Delegation recognized and commended the U.S. draft, 
as it was solely “concerned with non-dissemination” of nuclear weapons.61  
However, the UK went on to discuss a theoretical loophole present in the 
draft of Article II that would potentially allow a confederation of states to 
gain control of nuclear weapons, and stressed its desire to close the loophole 
and “to see dissemination interpreted in the strictest possible way.”62  
The Soviet Union also joined the discussion and asserted, “Only such a 
solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons—one 
that does not allow any loopholes or exceptions—is of any value for the 
cause of peace.”63  It seems that as early as 1965, the need to draft Article II 
in a manner dispositive of this issue was at the forefront of negotiations. 
                                                                                                                   
 60 William C. Foster, Dir., Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement to the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons (Aug. 17, 1965), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra 
note 41, at 349, 351.  
 61 Lord Chalfont, British Disarmament Minister, Statement to the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee: Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons (Aug. 19, 1965), reprinted 
in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 355, 359. 
 62 Id. at 360. 
 63 Semen K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Conference Representative, Statement to the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee: Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons (Aug. 31, 1965), 
reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 362, 363. 
50 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:37 
 
 
Approximately one month later on September 24, 1965, the Soviet Union 
issued a counter-proposal that would have also avoided the loophole, albeit 
through somewhat different wording, by requiring NNWSs “not to create, 
manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either 
independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the 
territory of other States.”64  However, the precise language and meaning of 
the Soviet draft treaty of September 1965 was overlooked by the ENDC 
members because the delegation from the United States highlighted the 
Soviets’ preoccupation with NATO and simply viewed the Soviet counter-
proposal as a signal that the Soviet Union was prepared to begin negotiations 
on the terms of the Treaty.65  
In March of 1966, the United States amended its draft to create three 
distinct obligations under Article II that, at least in some instances, address 
NNWSs as supply-side proliferators: 
1. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons . . . .  
2. Not to . . . provide, whether alone or in any association of 
non-nuclear-weapon States: (a) assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for 
such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear 
weapons . . . . 
3. Not to take any other action which would cause an 
increase in the total number of States and 
associations of States having control of nuclear 
weapons.66  
Over a year later, though, when the draft text that included the verbiage of 
the future Article II was released, provisions envisioning NNWSs as supply-
                                                                                                                   
 64 Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. II, para. 1, U.N. 
GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. 106 (Vol. III), U.N. Doc. A/5976 (Sept. 24, 1965), reprinted in U.S. 
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 443.  
 65 See William C. Foster, Dir., Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement to the 
First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Oct. 18, 
1965), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 474, 478 
(“[T]he Soviet draft continues to focus narrowly on Soviet preoccupation with 
NATO . . . . Yet we are encouraged by the fact that perhaps the Soviet Union is now prepared 
to negotiate.”). 
 66 U.S. Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament committee: Amendments 
to the U.S. Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. DCOR, Supp. 1966, 
U.N. Doc. DC/228, Annex 1, art. II (ENDC/152/Add.1, Mar. 21, 1966), reprinted in U.S. 
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1966, at 159, 
159−60 (1967).  
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side actors were missing.67  Even more baffling, this loophole was 
highlighted by Egypt68 during negotiations and nothing was done to address 
it.69  The Egyptian Delegation made its concerns quite clear: 
Indeed, it makes no mention of the obligation of the non-
nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty to refrain in their 
turn from assisting, encouraging or inducing in any way 
another non-nuclear-weapon State, whether a party to the 
treaty, or not, to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  It is quite obvious 
that therein lies a possibility of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons which must and can easily be eliminated by including 
this prohibition in the text of article II of the draft before us.70 
Despite Egypt’s obvious concern regarding Article II and the possibility 
of NNWSs acting as suppliers and proliferators of nuclear technology, the 
loophole was never closed.  
IV.  WHY WASN’T THE ARTICLE II PROBLEM ADDRESSED? 
Scholars and practitioners in the nonproliferation field offer three 
explanations for the Article II loophole: (A) fear of re-opening 
negotiations;71 (B) belief that NNWSs were not a realistic supply-side 
threat;72 and (C) failure to perceive a loophole.73   
                                                                                                                   
 67 Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. DCOR, Supp. 1967, 
U.N. Doc. DC/230, Annex IV, art. II (ENDC/192/Add.1, Aug. 24, 1967), reprinted in U.S. 
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1967, at 338, 339 
(1968); Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. DCOR, Supp. 1967, 
U.N. Doc. DC/230, Annex IV, sec. 8 (ENDC/193, Aug. 24, 1967), reprinted in U.S. ARMS 
CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra, at 338, 339.  These identical documents were 
submitted by the U.S. and Soviet delegations respectively.  U.S. ARMS CONTROL & 
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra, at 338 n.1. 
 68 At the time of the ENDC, Egypt was referred to as the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). 
 69 Brian Donnelly, Head, Non-Proliferation Dep’t of the Foreign and Common Wealth 
Office, British Diplomat Serv., Statement on the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Articles 
I, II, and VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (Jan. 1995) 
(transcript available at http://www.opanal.org/Articles/cancun/can-Donnelly.htm). 
 70 Hussein Khallaf, United Arab Republic Conference Representative, Statement to the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Sept. 26, 
1967), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 67, at 421, 
para. 8. 
 71 Donnelly, supra note 69. 
 72 Williamson, supra note 45, at 131. 
 73 Id. 
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A.  Fear of Reopening Negotiated Provisions 
During negotiations of Article II, the United States and Soviet Union 
clashed over the Multilateral Force Project (MFP).74  Under the MFP, the 
United States proposed to create a fleet of nuclear-armed submarines and 
warships manned by NATO crews.75  Accordingly, the initial U.S. draft of 
the NPT prohibited “the transfer of weapons to the ‘national’ control of 
[NNWSs],” but left open the possibility “for the supply of weapons to a 
group of countries.”76  This language was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, 
fearing that the project would equip West Germany with nuclear weapons.77  
Therefore, the Soviet draft text prohibited NNWSs from taking part in the 
“ ‘control or use of nuclear weapons,’ ” transmitting 
“ ‘information . . . which [could] be employed for the . . . use of nuclear 
weapons,’ ” and having “ ‘access’ ” to nuclear weapons, noticeably omitting 
the word “national.”78  These competing proposals left American-Soviet 
discussions deadlocked for over a year.79   
An agreement resolving the MFP issue was reached following 
contentious negotiations conducted secretly between U.S. Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.80  The United 
States agreed not to transfer direct control of nuclear weapons to its allies, 
with the understanding that the Soviet Union would not object to a U.S. 
interpretation of Articles I and II that allowed indirect nuclear weapons 
sharing through NATO.81  Under the U.S. interpretation, the United States 
would maintain peacetime control of nuclear weapons located on allied 
territory, but could transfer control directly to its allies in the event of war, at 
which point NPT obligations would cease to be binding.82  With this mutual 
                                                                                                                   
 74 B. Goldschmidt, The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 22 INT’L 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BULL., no. 3, 1980 at 73, 74−75.  
 75 See generally James B. Solomon, The Multilateral Force: America’s Nuclear Solution for 
NATO (1960–1965), at 1 (May 4, 1999) (unpublished Trident Scholar project report, United 
States Naval Academy) (available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&d 
oc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA375751) (outlining the American attempt “to create a NATO 
multilateral nuclear fleet”). 
 76 Goldschmidt, supra note 74, at 75. 
 77 Dimitris Bourantonis, The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 1965–1968: A 
Note, 19 INT’L HIST. REV. 347, 349 (1997). 
 78 GLENN T. SEABORG & BENJAMIN S. LOEB, STEMMING THE TIDE: ARMS CONTROL IN THE 
JOHNSON YEARS 192 (1987) (quoting Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, supra note 64). 
 79 Goldschmidt, supra note 74, at 74−75. 
 80 Id. at 75. 
 81 George Bunn, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems, 
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2003, at 4. 
 82 See Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Before the S. 
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understanding of Articles I and II in place, the United States and the Soviet 
Union were prepared to present a united front to the remaining negotiators.83 
Thus, one theory is that the United States and the Soviet Union rejected 
Egypt’s proposal to address the Article II ambiguity for fear that opening 
Articles I and II to negotiations would result in a breakdown of their hard-
won deal.84  The United States was already concerned about the reaction of 
NATO allies to the deal struck with the Soviet Union.85  By opening Article 
II to revision, there was the possibility that the states excluded from the 
American-Soviet understanding would wish to renegotiate other elements of 
the existing provisions.  This fear was verbalized by W.C. Foster, United 
States Representative and Co-Chairman of the ENDC, during a conference of 
the ENDC.  Foster stated: 
[T]he resolution has been subject to interpretations about which 
some controversy unfortunately has arisen.  At this stage in our 
work, I am convinced that we should not risk transferring this 
controversy about interpretation to the treaty itself by making 
the changes which the representatives of the United Arab 
Republic and Romania proposed.86   
At the eleventh hour, then, both the United States and the Soviet Union 
also feared the other side would lose resolve.  Therefore, it appears that the 
Cold War superpowers opted to turn a blind eye to the Article II ambiguity in 
an effort to prevent their deal from being renegotiated by the other states. 
                                                                                                                   
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 21, 27−28 (1968) (statement of Dean 
Rusk, U.S. Sec’y of State). 
 83 Goldschmidt, supra note 74, at 75. 
 84 Donnelly, supra note 69. 
 85 See, e.g., Aldo Moro, Pres., Italian Council of Ministers, Speech Before the Chamber of 
Deputies (July 13, 1967), as reprinted in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN A WORLD OF 
NUCLEAR POWERS 99, 99–100 (Stephen D. Kertesz ed., 1967) (“Presently all we know is that 
the United States and the Soviet Union, although they have reached an agreement of principle 
on various aspects of the questions, continue to examine other aspects of lesser importance 
about which an agreement has not yet been reached.  Until today, then, a treaty complete in its 
various parts does not exist.  Such a treaty will have to be brought before other governments 
and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee.  Only at that point will it be possible [for 
Italy] to evaluate the opportunity of carrying out the initiative suggested . . . .”). 
 86 William C. Foster, Dir., Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement to the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Feb. 27, 
1968), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON 
DISARMAMENT 1968, at 125, para. 88 (1969).  
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B.  Belief That NNWSs Were Not Supply Threats 
Shortsightedness on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to 
the threat of NNWSs as suppliers of nuclear weapons technology is another 
explanation offered for the Article II ambiguity.87  Some scholars suggest 
that, during the treaty drafting process, NWSs saw themselves as having a 
monopoly on nuclear materials and information.88  This short-term 
understanding led those states to write Articles I and II in terms of supply 
and demand.89  Unsurprisingly, history shows that a monopoly on new 
military technologies is merely transitory; whether it be the longbow, the 
machine gun, or nuclear weapons, new technologies and military secrets do 
not remain in the exclusive possession of only one state for long.90  As such, 
it is possible that NNWSs will acquire nuclear weapons technology pre- and 
post-accession to the NPT.   
While not envisaged at the time of negotiation, states may accede to the 
NPT already possessing the technological means to build nuclear weapons.  
For example, South Africa secretly developed and then dismantled a 
successful nuclear weapons program prior to acceding to the NPT in July 
1991.91  The mere fact that the program was renounced, however, does not 
eradicate the knowledge base and concomitant proliferation threat it 
possesses.  Not only could a state like South Africa use its expertise to 
resurrect its own nuclear weapons program, it could potentially assist other 
states in doing so.92  Should it decide to offer such assistance while a party to 
the NPT, it would arguably not violate its NPT Article II obligations.  This is 
certainly not to suggest that South Africa would ever proliferate, given its 
excellent track record in nonproliferation and leadership in the NPT, but it is 
certainly possible. 
States may also acquire the knowledge that forms the basis for a nuclear 
weapons program while party to the NPT.  This is also unremarkable, since 
some of this knowledge is now available on the Internet although critical 
                                                                                                                   
 87 James D. Fry, Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council WMD Coercive Disarmament 
Measures and Their Legal Implications, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 197, 285–86 (2008). 
 88 Id. at 286. 
 89 Id. at 285. 
 90 See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 15 (noting that, as early as 1945, the Manhattan 
Project’s “scientists warned that the United States could not rely on its current advantage in 
atomic weaponry” and that “[n]uclear research would not be an American monopoly for long, 
and secrecy would not mean protection”); see also Joyner & Parkhouse, supra note 48, at 214 
(noting that “[t]he existence of large quantities of nuclear weapons and fissile material spread 
across the world”).  
 91 ALBRIGHT, supra note 29, at 1–2. 
 92 DAVID ALBRIGHT, INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SECURITY, THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LEGACY 
AND THE ANC 17 (1994). 
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enrichment and reprocessing technologies are not publically available and 
remain extremely difficult to master.93  Integral to the NPT’s bargain is the 
right of NNWSs party to the NPT to pursue nuclear energy.94  However, 
states pursuing nuclear energy have a basis for arguing that they need to 
develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, which is clearly integral to nuclear 
weapons production.95  A state that masters centrifuge enrichment 
technology for peaceful purposes while a party to the NPT (under IAEA full 
scope safeguards) would gain the knowledge necessary to produce highly 
enriched uranium,96 that is, uranium enriched to over 20% in the isotope 
uranium-235, although true-weapons grade is enriched to over 90%.97  It is 
the process of enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels that poses the real 
technological obstacle to a nuclear weapons program.98  The actual creation 
of the explosive device utilized in highly enriched uranium weapons can be 
relatively easy.99  Thus, an NNWS with fuel cycle enrichment capacity could 
assist another state or non-state actor with a critical component of a nuclear 
weapons program.  Since this assistance is arguably not in violation of NPT 
Article II, NNWSs have less of an incentive to ensure that their assistance 
will not be exploited for non-peaceful purposes. 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Günther Handl, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Legitimacy as a Function of 
Process, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 & n.2 (2010) (noting that “at least forty-nine states 
[are] presumed to have the scientific knowledge and technological capability to build nuclear 
weapons,” and that such “sensitive nuclear know-how and expertise [is] shared globally and 
readily accessible” as “a result of the explosive growth of Internet-based information 
exchanges,” and indeed that, “[s]ometimes governments themselves inadvertently disclose 
sensitive nuclear weapons information”). 
 94 Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 1. 
 95 See Spector, supra note 4, at 624 (explaining that “there are legitimate reasons for 
countries to have enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, since both can be used to produce 
fuel for nuclear power reactors”). 
 96 PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT, THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE IN 
NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (2004), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statem 
ents/ddgs/2004/goldschmidt26042004.html.   
 97 CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 162; see also 1 RICHARD G. HEWLETT & OSCAR E. 
ANDERSON, JR., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION: THE NEW 
WORLD, 1939/1946, at 245 (1962) (explaining, “for to depend on implosion meant proceeding 
in an area where there was no experience and where many unforeseen and perhaps insoluble 
difficulties were sure to arise.  The gun method was a much better risk.”); see id. at 234–35 
(providing an expanded discussion of the gun method, which is the only route to a nuclear 
weapon using highly enriched uranium). 
 98 CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 6−7.  
 99 See id. at 9 (describing the use of large gas centrifuges as a common and economical 
method of enriching uranium); see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARILY CRITICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES LIST PART II: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES, at II-5-61 
(1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mct198-2/p2sec05.pdf (“[Ninety] percent of 
the overall difficulty in making a nuclear weapon lies in the production of special nuclear 
material (if no outside source is readily available) . . . .”). 
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C.  Failure to Perceive a Problem 
An additional possible explanation for the Article II ambiguity is that the 
NPT drafters did not believe that the ambiguity existed.  This argument 
stems from the rejection of Egypt’s proposal to amend Article II.100  At that 
time, the Co-Chairman Foster stated that the only plausible grounds for an 
NNWS to assist another state in acquiring a nuclear weapon would be 
eventual acquisition of the nuclear weapon for the assisting NNWS itself.101  
The acquisition of nuclear weapons is in contravention of NPT Article II 
obligations and therefore it was argued that there was no need to reopen the 
provision.102  However, NNWSs may have other motives for providing 
nuclear weapons assistance besides attaining their own nuclear weapons 
capability. 
First, states could provide assistance to other states or even non-state 
actors out of security concerns.  An NNWS might believe that its defense 
interests are not adequately protected through existing security 
arrangements.103  Consequently, it “might agree to provide quiet assistance to 
another state’s nuclear program because of the perceived security benefits” 
of such cooperation.104  Even though this instance predated the NPT, such 
may have been the case in French assistance to the Israeli nuclear program in 
the 1950s.105  Additionally, instability in the French colonies of North Africa 
made Israeli intelligence support invaluable to France.106  The breakthrough 
in nuclear assistance came during and after the Suez Canal Crisis, when 
France resolved to provide Israel with a research reactor in exchange for 
Israel’s collaboration in the operation.107   
It is plausible that NNWSs might be induced to offer similar strategic 
support to nuclear weapons programs given the right circumstances.  Such 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Foster, supra note 86, para. 83. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Alexis Roschin, Soviet Conference Representative, Statement to the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee (Feb. 27, 1968), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT 
AGENCY, supra note 86, at 118, para. 59. 
 103 Jacqueline R. Smith, Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Toward the 
1995 Extension Conference, in 87 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 82, 99 (Patricia A. Comella 
reporter, 1993). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Warner D. Farr, The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons, in THE 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION PAPERS 5 (Future Warfare Series No. 2, 1999), available at http:// 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm.  
 106 Id. at 3 (“France was Israel’s principal arms supplier, and as instability spread through 
French colonies in North Africa, Israel provided valuable intelligence obtained from contacts 
with sephardic Jews in those countries.”). 
 107 Id. at 4.  
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support, if provided without the intent to acquire nuclear weapons, would not 
fit within the explanation offered by the Soviet Representative.108  However, 
if assistance were provided to a state that was also a party to the Treaty then 
the receiving state would be in violation of NPT Article II.109  
Second, economic interests could drive proliferation.110  As one nuclear 
expert pointed out, “[m]ost people are horrified of nuclear weapons.  They 
understand the danger of them.  But if they’re being asked to buy or sell 
some vital piece of equipment that costs millions of dollars, then some of the 
concern is diminished, and they’re kind of willing to turn a blind eye.”111  An 
NNWS might indeed look the other way and choose to exploit the Article II 
ambiguity despite concerns that it harbors about the nuclear intentions of the 
importing state.112  As a strictly legal matter of NPT interpretation, there is 
little to suggest that it would be the exporting NNWS’s concern whether it 
was the intention of the importing state to proliferate and even whether such 
proliferation was consistent with the importing state’s obligations, should it 
have them, under Article II of the NPT.113  Should perceived economic 
benefits outweigh the proliferation concerns of an NNWS, the Article II 
ambiguity could provide a convenient legal pathway for trade in nuclear 
weapons technology, but the Article III issue would still need to be 
overcome.114 
Additionally, the delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union 
(the co-drafters of the Treaty) contended that assistance by an NNWS to 
another NNWS developing nuclear weapons technology would in fact 
constitute a violation of the NPT under the preamble, Articles II, and III; and 
therefore, an amendment to Article II was unnecessary.115  Specifically, the 
American delegation to the ENDC responded to Egypt’s concerns by stating: 
[S]ince we wholly share the desire of the representative of the 
United Arab Republic to make this treaty as effective as 
possible, I want to assure him again that we believe it does deal 
in a realistic way with the practical and significant problems to 
which he alluded.  However, while ensuring that the treaty does 
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 109 Smith, supra note 103, at 99. 
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 111 Profit and ‘Peril’ in the Secret Nuclear Trade, NPR (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2  
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deal effectively with such problems, we must avoid 
encumbering the treaty with provisions designed to deal with 
largely hypothetical possibilities.  Such provisions could pose 
unnecessary constitutional problems of implementation for 
some States.  Here, as with other aspects of this treaty, we must 
strike a balance between what is essential and what might in 
ideal circumstances be desirable—between attempts to deal 
with remote or unlikely contingencies and what all of us 
consider to be proper and necessary obligations of the 
parties.116  
This statement reaffirms the view that the United States attempted to 
minimize the significance of the ambiguity in the Treaty by arguing that the 
possibility of an NNWS transferring nuclear weapons technology, and thus 
behaving as a supply-side operator, was extremely remote and merely 
hypothetical, which it undoubtedly was when the Treaty was drafted in the 
late 1960s.  Perhaps this offers the best explanation for why the final text of 
Article II ultimately turned out that way. 
The Soviet Delegation seems to have more carefully considered Egypt’s 
concerns, and offered a thorough and direct response to Egypt’s proposed 
amendment.  The Soviets held that their interpretation of the preamble 
combined with Article II, or Article III alone, closed any theoretical loophole 
that might have existed in the Treaty.117  However, the Soviet Delegation did 
not precisely explain how the preamble—which is not legally binding—in 
combination with Article II, would close the theoretical loophole.  Rather, 
the Soviets seemed to rely on a common understanding between parties that 
proliferation of any kind would be contrary to the spirit of the resolution and 
that states would not knowingly violate it.  The Egyptian Delegation directly 
opposed this type of interpretation, particularly in a treaty of this importance:  
To do away with this loophole it is not enough to refer to the 
good faith that should prevail in the interpretation of treaties; 
because, however right it may be, this principle of good faith 
has never obviated the need for a precise written agreement, 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Foster, supra note 86, para. 90. 
 117 Roschin, supra note 102, para. 59 (“[I]n substance this amendment is covered by the 
meaning of article II and the preamble to the treaty.  If a non-nuclear-weapon State party to 
the treaty were to assist another non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire nuclear 
weapons, such a case—I repeat, according to the meaning of article II and the preamble to the 
treaty—would be regarded as a violation of the treaty.”). 
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particularly in a matter such as the one we are now dealing 
with.118   
However, Egypt’s concerns went unheeded as the Treaty drafters still failed 
to acknowledge a loophole, while none of the other ENDC member states 
supported Egypt’s views, perhaps because it would be yet another restriction 
on them, although admittedly, this is highly speculative. 
The Soviet Union elaborated more fully on its interpretation of Article III, 
and specifically why it was viewed as closing any potential loophole in 
Article II.  It maintained that the purpose of Article III was to establish 
clearly “that no State party to the treaty has the right to transfer to any non-
nuclear State fissionable materials or the appropriate equipment for the 
processing of such materials in circumvention of the safeguards laid down in 
the treaty, no matter in whose ownership.”119  Ultimately, the Soviet Union 
contended that the preamble and Articles II and III not only addressed and 
fully closed the loophole highlighted by Egypt, but also met the General 
Assembly’s requirement “that ‘[t]he treaty should be void of any loop-
holes’ ” as set out in GA Resolution 2028 (XX).120    
However, Article III simply requires that states party to the Treaty agree 
not to transfer nuclear materials or equipment especially designed or 
prepared for the production of nuclear materials to any NNWS, unless the 
supplied material would be placed under the IAEA safeguards system.121  
This fails to address the more likely possibility that an NNWS might provide 
aid under the guise of ignorance of the intentions of the state to which it is 
providing the assistance.122  Most transfers are in fact between non-state 
actors, which most often are corporations.123  No NPT party could evade 
Article III by claiming that the transfer was to a non-state actor.124  
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D.  Lessons from the Origin of Article II 
To the above three theories, which are based upon reluctance to address 
the issue or simple negligence and lack of imagination, it must be added as a 
theoretical possibility, even if highly implausible, that it was intentional.  
While there is no supporting evidence for such an assertion, when reviewing 
possible explanations, this must be included as one alternative.  Also, when 
one considers the number of legal and policy officials in multiple states and 
international organizations that would have had to review the draft treaty 
prior to its entry-into-force, it is conceivable that someone drafted it that way 
deliberately and then intentionally permitted it to remain, but again, this is 
highly speculative. 
The actual reason, if one exists, that Article II was never clarified may lie 
somewhere in the gray area among all explanations considered.  It is 
plausible that the United States and Soviet Union, distracted by NATO 
nuclear sharing issues, overlooked NNWSs as potential supply-side 
proliferators.  Once this mistake was recognized, they may have opted to 
avoid reopening discussions in light of the perceived inability of NNWSs to 
supply nuclear weapons technology and the belief that the only reason to 
supply such technology would be eventual self-arming.  But certainty about 
the origins of the text of Article II is relatively unimportant.  In the end, 
although explanations may account for its drafting, they do not definitively 
close the potential loophole.     
V.   CASE STUDY—GERMAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM SONDERWEG 
Germany’s Sonderweg program is an excellent example of Article II 
ambiguity in action.  In the 1970s, the Federal Republic of Germany, an 
NNWS party to the NPT, insisted that it was allowed to develop the entire 
nuclear fuel cycle in exercising its right to develop nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes.125  Germany maintained that as long as its motives were 
peaceful, it was not in violation of the NPT.126  Though this assertion was 
                                                                                                                   
technology).  
 124 See Fry, supra note 87, at 279 (noting that although Article III of the NPT “lack[s] any 
reference to non-State actors,” the NPT nonetheless requires safeguards to be “ ‘applied on all 
source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of 
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Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1)). 
 125 Andrew Grotto, Why Do States That Oppose Nuclear Proliferation Resist New 
Nonproliferation Obligations?: Three Logics of Nonproliferation Decision-Making, 18 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10 (2010).  
 126 See Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12 
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met with vehement disapproval from the United States, Germany went ahead 
with Sonderweg, its nuclear development program.127  After the successful 
development of the nuclear fuel enrichment process, the German company 
Siemens KWU entered into negotiations with Brazil for the sale and transfer 
of this technology.128  
At the time, Brazil was not a party to the NPT and was therefore exempt 
from the legal requirements of Article II to refrain from the acquisition and 
manufacture of nuclear weapons.129  Further, the United States suspected that 
Brazil’s nuclear program was not solely for the development of nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes.130  Regardless, Germany maintained its 
right to sell its enrichment technology to Brazil on the grounds that Brazil 
had signed other bilateral safeguard agreements with the IAEA.131  
Ultimately, the sale was not consummated and the fuel cycle technology was 
never transferred to Brazil.132  However, U.S. concerns that the Brazilian 
military government might establish a secret nuclear program, which could 
benefit from utilizing German technology, turned out to be correct.133  While 
Brazil had actually established a nuclear program, it was terminated in 1990 
due to lack of funding.134  If the Brazilian nuclear program had not been 
cancelled and the sale of nuclear technology to Brazil had been 
consummated, Germany might have borne a major responsibility for nuclear 
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 127 The West German deal included two power reactors and plans for six more, as well as 
plants for uranium processing, conversion, enrichment, and reprocessing.  Sharon Squassoni 
& David Fite, Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment, ARMS 
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Germany and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Berlin, Feb, 26, 2005), available at http://www.npoli  
cy.org/article_file/German_Nuclear_Export_Policy_and_the_Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weap
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proliferation in Brazil and the potential creation of an additional de facto 
NWS.135  This illustrates the importance of IAEA safeguards to prevent the 
diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses.  If it was under full scope 
safeguards, which are the most comprehensive the IAEA offers, and the 
technology was provided under safeguards, then Germany’s responsibility 
for any potential Brazilian weapons development would be greatly 
diminished.   
In this example, Germany, a party to the NPT, was dangerously close to 
exporting nuclear enrichment technology to Brazil, at the time not a party to 
the NPT, which could have ultimately led to the development of a Brazilian 
nuclear weapon.  So long as the technology was provided under safeguards, 
if Brazil had later diverted the German technology for use in a clandestine 
weapons program, it would not constitute a German violation of the NPT.  
This demonstrates that the views of the United States and Soviet Union 
during the negotiations of the NPT, that NNWSs acting as suppliers of 
nuclear technology was nothing more than “a remote or unlikely”136 
hypothetical, did not adequately consider future scenarios.  
VI.  ADDRESSING ARTICLE II NOW 
The real enigma is not whether the perception of a gap in the coverage of 
Article II is accurate, but rather how, or whether, to attempt to close it.  
Currently, Article II binds NNWSs to the mirror image of Article I’s 
obligations for NWSs.  Ideally, however, NNWSs should also be under clear 
obligations akin to those found in Article I with respect to assistance.  With 
the NPT regime in place for over four decades,137 the question becomes 
whether the difficulty in introducing modifications to responsibilities makes 
closing the potential loophole impossible.   
A.  Amending the NPT to Clarify Article II Is Probably Not Feasible Either 
Politically or Procedurally   
Politically, the NPT represents a delicate compromise that has withstood 
the test of time.  Any possible amendment to Article II would open the entire 
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Treaty to revision.138  This concern has become particularly acute in recent 
years as NNWSs have been increasingly disillusioned with the American and 
Russian nuclear disarmament efforts.139  As a condition of the indefinite 
extension of the NPT in 1995, many NNWSs believed that the NWSs would 
disarm more quickly.140  The NNWSs now question whether this has 
happened and perceive U.S. and Russian disarmament efforts as 
insufficient.141  This argument is also a basis for the claim that those states 
are not meeting their Article VI obligations.142  The fear is that, should the 
NPT be opened to amendment, NNWSs will insist on nuclear disarmament 
in a time-bound framework that would be unacceptable to the United States 
and Russia, and most likely to the other NWSs as well.143  Additionally, an 
amendment to the NPT could be seen as an admission that the framers of the 
NPT erred in the drafting of Article II by failing to incorporate Egypt’s 
proposals and to perceive the actual role NNWSs play in the NPT regime.   
Procedurally, the amendment process specified in Article VIII is so 
cumbersome that it makes change highly unlikely.144  First, one-third of the 
NPT’s member states must request a conference on any one proposal for true 
amendment discussion to begin.145  That hurdle, in and of itself, is attainable.  
Second, any amendment will not enter into force until it is approved and 
ratified by a majority of parties to the NPT, all NWSs, and all parties that are 
members of the IAEA’s Board of Governors at the time the amendment is 
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circulated.146  Finally, only states that ratify an amendment are bound by its 
provisions.147  States party to the NPT that do not approve the amendment 
remain bound by the previous version of the NPT, meaning that different 
versions of the NPT would be in force at the same time.148  These procedural 
requirements, combined with a lack of political will on the part of Russia and 
the United States, make amendment of the NPT a near impossibility. 
However, Article II could be clarified in a variety of less drastic methods 
not involving NPT amendment, which is, as a practical matter, unattainable.  
There is no question that UNSCR 1540 addresses the non-state actor facet of 
the problem.  For example, a commitment by NNWSs not to act as supply-
side proliferators could be negotiated in a separate international agreement or 
in parallel and identical political commitments by heads of state that might 
then enact national legislation that would make such assistance illegal.149  
The shortcoming of this approach is that it requires NNWSs to embrace an 
additional nonproliferation obligation at a time when the commitment of the 
nuclear powers to nonproliferation is being questioned in light of the 
perceived slow pace of disarmament and the recent U.S.−India Agreement 
on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.150  And that raises the issue of political 
will anew.  An alternative is to attempt to voluntarily “impose” these 
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obligations through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)151 as a condition of 
the supply of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.152  While the NSG 
guidelines are non-binding, they are generally observed as political 
commitments by the states that participate.153  These are just a few of the 
ways a supply-side commitment could be addressed by NNWSs.  The key 
point is that by avoiding the NPT amendment process, the possibility of 
closing the Article II loophole becomes significantly more feasible.  But the 
NSG is not an NPT-based organization and is voluntary as opposed to 
Treaty-based.154  Therefore, attempts to use this organization as a solution to 
the problem may reignite the perennial argument regarding the 
discriminatory nature of the NPT. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Article II of the NPT, which outlines the obligations of NNWSs party to 
the NPT, contains a significant ambiguity that an NNWS might attempt to 
exploit to assist other states or non-state actors in the development and 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.  The ambiguity was likely created as a result 
of the U.S. and Soviet preoccupation with NATO and the MFP, combined 
with their failure or unwillingness to recognize that any such ambiguity 
existed.  Despite the U.S. and Soviet insistence, the ambiguity is very real 
and has the potential to lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  As 
previously explained, the German situation would not have been any 
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different with an Article II obligation not to assist Brazil.  It is only an 
example of how NNWS-to-NNWS commerce has the potential to result in 
nuclear weapons assistance, contrary to what some drafters of the NPT may 
have anticipated.  Though there is no clear path to addressing the risk and 
imposing supply-side obligations on NNWSs, either politically or 
procedurally, awareness of the background and significance of the Article II 
problem is the key to preventing NNWSs from ever seeking to justify 
assistance to a non-party NNWS on the grounds that the NPT does not 
address NNWS-NNWS assistance in express terms.  Finally, NPT parties 
should be on guard to rebut any suggestion that such assistance would be 
permissible.  The U.S. view, which focuses on the need for vigilant 
enforcement of NPT requirements, remains the optimal approach. 
